of Income Dynamics (PSID), I extend prior work with nearly 20 additional years of data, holding over 43,000 additional person-year observations, to consider whether, to what extent, and why previously identified Black-White gaps in the translation of mobility expectations into actual mobility changed between 1970 and 2011. Multivariate logistic regression results presented here find a substantial Black-White gap in moving or staying put as expected-a gap that shows no significant change over time-driven largely by racial differences in the positive effect of socioeconomic status on the translation of expectations of mobility into actual moves.
Understanding how racial gaps in the ability to move when expected have changed over time is important for not only advancing theoretical models of residential mobility but also for understanding the consequences of long-term mobility decline with respect to processes of neighborhood change, social and economic inequality, and the geography of opportunity. By most accounts, contemporary mobility declines are attributable to increasing investment in and attachment to place, characterized as "rootedness" (Cooke 2011; Fischer 2002) , which may benefit individuals, family, and society (Newman et al. 2010) . Results presented here, however, also point to an increasing tendency among Black, and some White, householders to remain "stuck" in place-unable to move despite the expectation of doing so. The implications of an increasingly stuck population for future work on residential mobility as well as for racial segregation, economic inequality, and access to opportunity structures are discussed.
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Racial Stratification in the ExpectationMobility Link
Models of residential satisfaction suggest that the residential mobility process begins with a mismatch in current residential quality, size, or location and perceived residential needs (Brown and Moore 1970; Rossi 1980; Speare, Goldstein, and Frey 1975; Wolpert 1966) . Given a mismatch between current residence and perceived needs, potential migrants compare the current residence with any number of potential destinations and subsequently form mobility expectations based on this comparison. Weighing the costs and benefits associated with mobility, potential movers then decide whether to translate mobility expectations into a move or not. The residential mobility literature supports the basic tenets of these models-in particular, those linking mobility expectations to actual mobility (Bach and Smith 1977; Deane 1990; Landale and Guest 1985; Newman and Duncan 1979) .
The spatial assimilation and place stratification models, while typically used to understand later stages of the residential mobility process, also suggest hypotheses concerning racial stratification in the translation of mobility expectations into actual mobility. The spatial assimilation model asserts that racial and ethnic stratification in residential mobility is a function of differences in socioeconomic status and human capital (Alba and Logan 1991; Massey 1985) . Thus, group differences in education, income, and other human capital characteristics should explain any racial gaps in the ability to translate expectations into actual mobility. By extension, changes in racial gaps over time should reflect concomitant shifts in the distribution of human capital across racial groups.
In contrast, the place stratification model suggests that systematic discrimination at multiple stages in the residential mobility process creates a segmented housing market in which the ability of minorities to translate socioeconomic gains into residential quality is limited (Alba and Logan 1991; Logan and Molotch 1987) . The strong version of this perspective stresses the disadvantaged position of Black householders in the housing market: While both Black and White householders will see positive returns on socioeconomic gains, these gains will be larger for White householders. A weaker version of this perspective stresses White advantage across the socioeconomic spectrum: While White householders of any status can gain access to good neighborhoods, only the highest status Black householders can. With respect to racial gaps in the translation of mobility expectations into actual mobility, the stratification perspective suggests that Blacks who expect to move will be less likely than Whites with similar expectations to actually move because their mobility options are limited. It follows that any shifts over time in the racial gap in the ability to translate expectations into mobility may reflect new legal barriers to discrimination or the development of new forms of exclusion (Massey, Rothwell, and Domina 2009) .
Racial gaps in the ability of householders to move or stay put as expected may also be rooted in the different neighborhood constraints Black and White householders typically face. A vast literature documents substantial racial disparities in neighborhood quality, safety, amenities, racial composition, and poverty (Lichter, Parisi, and Taquino 2012; Massey and Denton 1993; Massey and Fischer 2003) , and these disparities influence the residential mobility process even after controlling for individual and household determinants of residential sorting (Sampson 2012; Sharkey 2013) . While White householders tend to leave impoverished and racially diverse neighborhoods, Black householders typically find themselves unable to act on preferences for more diverse neighborhoods or escape high-poverty communities (Crowder and South 2005; South and Crowder 1997) . It follows, then, that any racial differences in neighborhood context may contribute to racial gaps in the ability to move as expected, and any changes in neighborhood context over time may increase or decrease the size of that gap.
Similarly, the translation of mobility expectations into actual mobility may also depend on constraints and opportunities in the local metropolitan area. The housing availability model relates mobility to the openness or closure of the local housing market (South and Crowder 1997) . Put simply, householders are more likely to move when there are other housing options available. Open housing markets with relatively low rents and abundant vacant units encourage mobility, whereas competitive and high-cost housing markets discourage it. Because White and Black Americans often live in different housing markets and occupy different niches within those markets, the relative openness or closure of the housing market in which householders make mobility decisions may help explain racial gaps in the realization of mobility expectations. By extension, changes in the relative competition for and/or cost of housing over time may influence observed racial gaps.
Changes in the Expectation-Mobility Link over Time
The discussion thus far has considered racial stratification in the link between mobility expectations and actual mobility, but there are also reasons to suspect substantial changes in the basic relationship between expectations and mobility, regardless of race, over time. A small but growing body of literature has noted substantial declines in mobility among Americans since the mid twentieth century (Cooke 2011 (Cooke , 2013 Fischer 2002; Wozniak 2011, 2017) . The default, but by no means conclusive, explanation of this phenomenon is a cultural one: Americans have experienced a cultural shift toward rootedness characterized by an increasing attachment to place and facilitated by technological advancements in communication and transportation that reduce the need for permanent relocation (Zelinsky 1971) .
The shift toward rootedness is thought to be both universal and voluntary. In his early description of mobility decline, Fischer (2002:193) notes, "the story of increasing rootedness generally applies across age, gender, race, housing tenure, and . . . class." Increasing immobility among all Americans is, according to Cooke (2011:202) , a voluntary phenomenon: "The U.S. has long ago entered into a post-modern period of reduced mobility because of the increased value of leisure time [and] increased ability to remain rooted and yet travel for leisure and work." While it is difficult to measure changes in cultural attachment to place, the notions that American mobility decline is universal and voluntary are subject to empirical verification.
Work to date on the long-term decline in American mobility generally confirms the universality of declines, but the assertion that mobility decline is voluntary has not been scrutinized. Changes in the composition of the American population known to contribute to mobility and migration decline likely do so by decreasing the desire for and expectation of it. Life cycle characteristics, alongside the socioeconomic factors discussed previously, are among the strongest predictors of mobility (Long 1988) : While mobility declines with age, childrearing and changes in relationship or employment status often necessitate it by changing residential needs and generating dissatisfaction with the current residence. Therefore, shifts in the composition of the population with respect to life cycle characteristics since the mid twentieth century-including population aging, declining marriage and fertility rates, and delayed labor market entry-undoubtedly contribute to aggregate mobility declines (Cooke 2011) . Studies to date disagree on the precise contribution of compositional shifts to the trend toward immobility (e.g., Karahan and Rhee 2014; Molloy et al. 2011 ), but to the extent that contemporary mobility decline represents the natural progression of Americans across the life course, it likely also represents an increase in residential satisfaction and therefore may be characterized as a voluntary shift toward rootedness.
Summary of Theoretical Expectations
Prior work on racial gaps in the ability of householders to move as expected supports both the place stratification and spatial assimilation perspectives. Crowder's (2001) analysis of PSID data for the 1970 to 1993 period finds large BlackWhite gaps in the actuation of mobility expectations. While group differences in housing tenure, socioeconomic status, and other familial and contextual characteristics explain a portion of this gap, Black householders remain significantly less likely to actuate mobility expectations than their White counterparts. Moreover, Crowder's (2001) analysis provides evidence in favor of the strong version of the place stratification perspective (Alba and Logan 1991) : While socioeconomic resources help White householders translate their expectations into mobility outcomes, high-income and highly educated Black householders are unable to leverage their socioeconomic resources to realize their mobility expectations. I expect similar patterns to emerge in the analysis that follows.
I expect that the racial gap in moving when expected has narrowed since 1970 because of the erection of legal barriers to certain types of discrimination in the housing market and trends toward integration in many metropolitan areas. The Fair Housing Act (FHA) of 1968 outlawed outright racial discrimination in the sale, rental, or finance of homes, and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975 and Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977 gave the FHA some bite. Though FHA, HMDA, and CRA did not eliminate discrimination, their enactment and enforcement facilitated considerable progress toward integration in many metropolitan areas (Glaeser and Vigdor 2012) . Between 1970 and 2010, segregation (dissimilarity) in the average metropolitan area declined from nearly .80 to .59, though integration has been slowest in those metropolitan areas with the largest Black populations (Logan and Stults 2011) . As such, with respect to the realization of mobility expectations, I expect to see these legal changes and trending integration reflected in increasing returns to Black householders' socioeconomic status over time.
The notion that rootedness drives long-term mobility decline has not been tested, but the general argument implies two hypotheses regarding householders' mobility expectations. First, because rootedness suggests a voluntary attachment to place, the expectation of mobility among householders should decline over time more or less in step with observed declines in mobility rates. Second, because knowledge of potential destinations is a key factor in the mobility process (Crowder and Krysan 2016; Harvekes, Bader, and Krysan 2016; Krysan and Bader 2009 ) and technological advancements in communication and transportation reduce the information costs associated with mobility, correspondence between mobility expectations and actual mobility should strengthen over time. To the extent that either of these hypotheses are unsupported in the analyses that follow, long-term mobility decline may represent the increasing tendency of Americans to remain stuck rather than rooted in place.
MEtHODS AnD DAtA
Subsequent analyses draw from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, a longitudinal, nationally representative survey of Americans and their families (Hill 1992) . Beginning in 1968 with roughly 5,000 families, the PSID sample has grown to over 9,000 families as of 2013 as new households formed by PSID respondents are incorporated. The PSID includes detailed demographic, life cycle, family, and economic characteristics, making the data suitable for this study of residential mobility.
Respondents for this analysis are selected from PSID surveys between 1970 and 2011. I then restrict the sample further to only non-Latino White and non-Latino Black household heads. Restricting the sample to household heads is necessary to avoid counting multiple moves made by individuals in the same family. Restricting the sample to those respondents who self-identified as nonLatino and Black or White is necessary because the PSID panel contains too few members of other racial and ethnic groups prior to 1990 to support group-specific analyses. Selection on these criteria results in an effective sample containing at least one observation per survey from 6,872 Black and 9,824 White householders.
Measuring Mobility Outcomes
In the following analyses, data are arranged in person-year format, allowing the prospective tracing of several different moves made by each respondent. The dependent variable in all analyses is coded 1 if the respondent moved in a given mobility interval and 0 if they did not.
The PSID switched from an annual to a biennial survey in 1997, and the retrospective nature of the PSID mobility questions means that the switch essentially gives respondents more time to move. I account for this switch by extending the effective mobility interval across all waves to extend from t to t + 15 months. Retrospective mobility items in the PSID have also changed subtly since 1968 in ways that appear to increase the reporting of mobility outcomes and therefore the probability that expectations are translated into actual mobility (or not). I include in all models two dummy variables to account for these changes to PSID mobility items in 1999 and 2003.
The longitudinal nature of the PSID coupled with the retrospective assessment of mobility outcomes means that respondent attrition could bias estimates of mobility downward. Such attrition is a valid concern but is not likely to have biased the results reported here. Response rates in nearly every wave of the PSID are above 90 percent (PSID Main Interview User Manual 2015) , and the PSID uses a variety of strategies to minimize attrition, including monetary incentives, respondent newsletters, and off-year mailing address updates (Schoeni et al. 2013) . Furthermore, the family network structure of PSID sampling means that a mobile respondent's next of kin can easily update his or her contact information.
Measuring Mobility Expectations
The PSID contains several items offering insight into mobility expectations. Household heads in every wave of the PSID are asked, "Are you (head) likely to move in the next few years?" Those expecting to move are also asked why and how certain they are that they will actually end up moving. There is a precedent in the literature to focus only on purposive moves, those made to improve one's residential or economic standing (Crowder 2001) . In this paper, however, theoretical emphasis is placed on unexpected and forced mobility as well, which may be missed if only purposive expectations are counted. As such, the measure of mobility expectations used here defines the expectation to move broadly. Householders who expect to move are coded 1 on the mobility expectation variable, and those reporting no expectation of mobility are coded 0. In addition to the core analyses presented in the following, I conducted a series of supplemental analyses using expectation measures restricted with respect to both the probability of actually moving and the reason for expecting to move. I discuss these supplemental analyses in the following, but results presented here are, generally speaking, robust to changes in the operationalization of mobility expectations.
Measuring Other Independent Variables
The spatial assimilation model of residential mobility suggests that socioeconomic characteristics may explain any racial gap in the expectationmobility link. To account for racial differences in employment income as well as wealth and other assets, I control for family income (logged). In the PSID, this item captures the total taxable family income for the preceding year in thousands of 2000 constant dollars. Educational attainment indicates the number of years of completed education for the household head. Current employment (1 = employed) and changes in employment (1 = change between t and t + 1) for the household head gauge respondents' relative economic stability (Newman and Duncan 1979; Speare 1974) and the degree to which respondents are tied to their current location and residence (Long 1988) .
Life cycle characteristics and transitions are associated with mobility. To model the generally negative and nonlinear effect of age, I include both the household head's age (in years) and the quadratic term age-squared. Married couples are generally less mobile than their single counterparts (South and Deane 1993) , but changes in marital status often necessitate mobility (Speare and Goldscheider 1987) . Therefore, I control for current marital status (1 = married or cohabiting) and changes in marital status over the mobility interval. Householders with children, measured in this analysis as the total number of children in the household, may be more tied to the community and therefore less likely than their childless counterparts to move (Long 1972; Rossi 1980) . At the same time, however, children may also necessitate mobility in search of more suitable housing or neighborhoods with quality schools (South and Crowder 1997) . Finally, because female householders tend to move more often than males (Long 1992) , I also control for the gender of the household head (1 = female).
Models of residential satisfaction stress the importance of several housing characteristics in determining the mobility of families and individuals (Speare 1974) . Residential crowding, measured here as the number of persons per room, increases the likelihood of moving (Rossi 1980) . Net of other factors, homeownership (1 = homeowner) reduces mobility, relative to renters, by virtue of greater financial and social investments in the current location as well as the greater costs associated with buying and selling a home. Finally, mobility is negatively associated with the tenure length (Rossi 1980; Speare et al. 1975) , measured here as a dummy variable indicating whether the householder has lived in the same house for at least three years (1 = yes).
Several neighborhood-and metropolitan-level contextual characteristics capture various constraints householders may face when translating expectations into actual mobility. Because Black householders in particular are at a considerable disadvantage when it comes to escaping segregated and high-poverty neighborhoods, I control for the poverty rate and the racial composition (percent Black) in the origin tract. Metropolitan housing market variables capture "tightness" and competition in the local housing market. The proportion of housing units in the metro area that are vacant and the proportion of units built in the last 10 years directly gauge available options for householders expecting to move. The owner-occupancy rate is also included because markets that are ownerdominated are likely tighter than those where rental units are more prevalent. As an indicator of local housing costs, I include a logged measure of the average home value in constant 2000 dollars in the metropolitan area. Finally, I include a series of dummy variables to account for regional (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West) variations in unmeasured economic, social, and political characteristics that may influence mobility. These contextual characteristics are drawn from the Neighborhood Change Database, which normalizes tract and metropolitan boundaries over time and reports decennial census and American Community Survey (ACS) data. PSID records for the [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] period are linked to 1970 census data, while those for the 1976-1985, 1986-1995, and 1996-2005 Analyses proceed as follows. First, I estimate logistic regression models predicting the log-odds of inter-dwelling mobility as a function of mobility expectations and race while controlling for the individual, familial, and contextual characteristics discussed previously. I then add a time component to those models to examine how the effect of mobility expectations and race changes between 1970 and 2011. Second, I adjudicate the strong and weak versions of the place stratification perspective by modeling an interaction effect between mobility expectations, income, and race. Finally, to shed light on the underlying character of mobility decline, I describe trends in the expectation of mobility for Black and White householders and consider these trends in light of changes in the relationship between expecting to move and actually moving. Because the observations contributed by the same individual over time are not independent, standard errors in all models are corrected by clustering observations for the same individual over time (Liang and Zeger 1986) .
RESultS
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1 , separately for Black and White householders. Over the period from 1970 to 2011, Black householders were more likely than White householders to expect to move in the near future (41 percent to 36 percent) and slightly more likely to actually move (22 percent to 18 percent). The higher mobility of Black householders reflects group differences in homeownership, family characteristics, and socioeconomic status. Only 36 percent of Black householders are homeowners, compared to 66 percent of Whites. Black women are also far more likely to head the household than White women in this sample (46 percent and 22 percent respectively), and Black households have more children, on average, than White households. Black householders live in predominantly Black neighborhoods (62 percent Black, compared to just 6 percent for Whites) with much higher poverty rates (25 percent to 10 percent). Finally, while they tend to live in very different neighborhood contexts, the housing markets of Black and White householders in the sample are quite similar with respect to home values, vacancy rates, homeownership rates, and the size of the recently built housing stock.
Racial Stratification in the ExpectationMobility Link
As Crowder (2001) found in prior work, there is a significant gap in the ability of Black and White householders to move or stay put when they expect to do so. Table 2 presents the results of a series of logistic regression models predicting the log-odds of moving between dwellings between successive PSID interviews. Expecting to move in the near future significantly increase the odds of actually moving among both Black and White householders (β = 2.29, p < .001). However, as the negative coefficient in Model 1 for the interaction between race and mobility expectations indicates (β = -.71, p < .001), there is a large and statistically significant racial difference in the connection between mobility expectations and actual mobility. Expecting to move is substantially less predictive of actually moving for Blacks than for Whites.
Black-White differences in socioeconomic status account for only a small portion of the gap in the effect of mobility expectations. Model 2 in Table 2 adds in several measures of socioeconomic status, which decrease the magnitude of the Black × expectations interaction term slightly (from -.71 to -.69), but the effect remains substantial and statistically significant. As such, contrary to the expectations of the assimilation model, after controlling for racial differences in socioeconomic characteristics, the connection between mobility expectations and actual mobility is still significantly weaker for Blacks than for Whites.
Life cycle, residential satisfaction, and contextual perspectives help account for Black-White differences in mobility (Table 1) but do little to account for the differential effect of expectations on mobility. Model 3 in Table 2 shows that several life cycle correlates of residential satisfaction reduce the log-odds of mobility, including marital/ cohabiting status, childrearing, homeownership, and extended tenure length, while other factors associated with residential dissatisfaction (persons per room, change in employment status, change in marital status) promote mobility. As poverty within a householder's neighborhood increases, the odds of mobility decrease significantly. This is consistent with the established literature on mobility in disadvantaged contexts noting the difficulties associated with escaping poverty (Crowder and South 2005; South and Crowder 1997) . Finally, as predicted by the housing availability model, householders are significantly more likely to move in less expensive housing markets with higher vacancy rates and larger new housing stocks. Accounting for satisfaction and context reduces overall gaps in mobility by roughly half, but a large Black-White gap in the effect of expectations on mobility persists.
It is tempting to underestimate the practical impact of the small interaction effects shown in Figure 1 depicts graphically the BlackWhite gap in the probability of expected and unexpected inter-dwelling mobility as predicted by Models 1 and 3 of Table 2 . Consistent with prior studies (Crowder 2001) , the left-hand panel of Figure 1 shows a large gross Black-White mobility gap among those who do not expect to move. While only 6.5 percent of White householders in this sample experience an unexpected move, 11 percent of Black householders did. This gap suggests that mobility for Blacks is less a matter of choice than it is for Whites, perhaps reflecting racial disparities in the incidence of eviction (Desmond 2012 (Desmond , 2016 Desmond et al. 2013) . Retrospective items in the PSID that gauge the respondent's reasons for making a move also support this conclusion. Nearly 20 percent of Black householders report making a move necessitated by "outside events" while only 14 percent of Whites do so. Nevertheless, the Black-White gap in the gross probability of expected mobility is rather small: 40 percent of Whites and 37 percent of Blacks who expected to move at time t did so by time t + 1. As shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 1 , individual and contextual controls do not explain the racial mobility gap in unexpected moves and by accounting for the higher mobility of Black householders, unveil an even larger racial gap in expected moves. Among those who expect to move, Black householders are 27 percent less likely to realize those expectations than Whites (.247 vs. .314), all else equal. As such, even after controlling for racial differences in socioeconomic status and neighborhood context, Blacks are significantly less likely than Whites to move when expected and significantly more likely to move when not expecting to.
The Black-White gap in moving as expected is not only robust to controls but also shows no signs of significant change between 1970 and 2011. Model 4 in Table 2 introduces a three-way Black × expectation× year interaction effect that tracks Black-White gaps in the effects of mobility expectations over time. If the racial gap in expectations and mobility was shrinking over time, Model 4 in Table 2 would show a positive and significant Black × expectation × year coefficient indicating that each additional year increased the influence of Black expectations on mobility over and above any yearly change in the effects for White householders. However, Model 4 shows a negative Black × expectation × year coefficient (β = -.005, p > .05), meaning that year after year, the effect of expectations on mobility weakens faster for Blacks than for Whites, albeit at a rate not significantly different from zero. As such, while the Black-White gap in the expectationmobility link has not grown, there are also no signs of progress toward racial parity.
Racial Segmentation in Local Housing Markets
The substantial and persistent gap in the ability of Black and White householders to move as expected, while not attributable to group differences in socioeconomic status, has foundations in the differential ability of Black and White householders to leverage those resources in local housing markets. Table 3 presents selected coefficients from a series of racespecific models testing the place stratification hypothesis that income differentially moderates the ability of Black and White householders to move when they expect to. As shown in the first two models in Table 3 , family income significantly increases the odds of realizing mobility expectations for both White and Black householders (see expectation × income, β = .24 and .09, p < .001, respectively). However, this effect is significantly stronger for White householders, as indicated by the negative and statistically significant Black × expectation × income coefficient in the pooled model in Table 3 (β = -.164, p < .001). Black-White differences in the leveraging of socioeconomic resources appears to account for much of the observed Black-White gap in the effect of expectations. As shown in the pooled model of Table 3 , the Black × expectation coefficient measuring the Black-White gap in expectations and mobility is reduced to statistical insignificance once this phenomenon is accounted for (β = .05, p > .05).
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As such, these results provide evidence in favor of the strong version of the place stratification perspective: Black householders' socioeconomic gains are less helpful than those of Whites when it comes to realizing mobility expectations. Moreover, supplemental analyses (not shown) find that no significant progress has been made in the past 40 years with respect to the ability of Black householders to leverage their socioeconomic resources when attempting to act on their expressed mobility expectations. The distinct mobility patterns and neighborhood contexts of Black and White householders in otherwise similar housing markets offer further evidence in favor of the strong version of the place stratification perspective. As shown in Table 1 , the metropolitan housing characteristics of Black and White householders are, on average, quite similar despite the fact that the typical Black householder resides in a predominantly Black neighborhood with much higher poverty rates. Race-specific models in Table 3 show that similar housing markets have remarkably different influences on the mobility patterns of Black and White householders. Black householders are particularly responsive to housing vacancies, while White householders are significantly more mobile in markets with larger shares of newly constructed units. Expensive markets suppress mobility for both White and Black householders, but this effect is significantly stronger among Blacks (results not shown). Coupled with significant neighborhood variation in poverty and racial composition and the immobilizing effects of neighborhood poverty for Black householders (β = -.58, p < .001), the patterning of mobility within otherwise similar housing markets is consistent with significant and persistent racial discrimination.
The Weakening Expectation-Mobility Link
The persistent Black-White gap in moving as expected is even more concerning in light of trends in the expectation of mobility over time. all householders regardless of race are increasingly less likely to move or stay put when they expect to. As evidenced by the expectation × year interaction effect in Model 4 of Table 2 , the generally positive effect of expecting to move on actually moving weakens significantly over time (β = -.008, p < .001). Figure 3 plots the trends in the probability of mobility for Black and White householders contingent on whether they expect to move or not. As discussed previously, the racial gap in mobility among those who expect to move is stable over time and primarily reflects housing market segmentation and discrimination faced by Black householders. However, the probability of actually moving when one expects to do so has dropped considerably since 1970 for White and Black householders alike. In 1970, the odds of moving with versus without the expectation to do so were approaching 3 to 1 (.30/.12 = 2.51); by 2009, those odds had fallen below 2 to 1 (.201/.101 = 1.99). These trends run contrary to the expectations of the rootedness hypothesis on mobility decline and suggest instead that declining mobility for many is attributable to their increasing tendency to remain stuck in place. Rather than leveraging communication and transportation advances to overcome the informational barriers in translating expectations into actual mobility, Americans today appear to have less control over the residential mobility process than at any time in the past 40 years. While the expectation of mobility in the near future has declined for White householders, the same is not true for Black householders. To be sure, this leaves some room for rootedness among a portion of the White population and is likely related to significant population aging and other demographic shifts among native, non-Latino Whites (Carll, Foster, and Crowder 2016; Cooke 2011) . However, the declining likelihood of moving when expected among both White and Black householders suggests that a growing share of Americans is stuck in place.
The use of the term stuck to describe the increasing immobility of expectant householders does not appear to be a mischaracterization of an otherwise positive outcome. Consider, for example, a householder who expects to move because of mortgage delinquency and impending foreclosure. In such a case, immobility is likely a positive outcome indicating a lack of foreclosure, but the preceding analyses would consider them stuck. Through 1993, the PSID included a follow-up item for expectant householders gauging the reason for their mobility expectations. Responses are categorized as either purposive (i.e., for consumptive or productive purposes such as to find a more suitable home or relocate for work), due to outside events (i.e., foreclosure, eviction, natural disaster, or some other emergency), or other. Over the course of the PSID, only a small share (17 percent) of all stuck householders expect to move due to outside events. The vast majority (82 percent) of all householders who end up stuck expected to move for purposive reasons, such as to take a new job or improve their residential location. There is also no indication of significant racial differences in the reasons for mobility expectations or changes in the purposive share over time.
Moreover, growth in the share of Americans who are stuck does not reflect changes in what PSID householders mean when they say they expect to move. One would expect a weakening link between expecting to move and actually moving if respondents in successive PSID waves are increasingly optimistic about their prospects. Since 1975, the PSID has included a follow-up item for expectant householders that gauges the likelihood of an eventual move. Trends in householders' certainty about moving as expected show no evidence of increasingly or overly optimistic expectations over time. In fact, higher rates of uncertainty among those who end up stuck suggest that householders are quite realistic: While only 20 percent of all householders expecting to move admit they are more uncertain that a move will take place, fully 25 percent of those who end up stuck admitted the same. Supplemental analyses (not shown) also find evidence of a robust and significant decline in mobility even among householders who say they "definitely" or "probably" will move when they expect to.
Furthermore, though the Great Recession had a dramatic impact on residential mobility and migration, it does not appear to be driving the weakening link between expectations and actual moves. Prior work has documented recession-related declines in migration and increases in local mobility (Cooke 2011; Stoll 2013 ) that likely strained the ability of householders to realize stated expectations. Given that there is no apparent increase in unexpected mobility among PSID householders (Figure 3 ), this strain must operate by limiting mobility among those expecting to move: for example, because many homeowners, particularly in Black neighborhoods, were underwater on their mortgages (Rugh and Massey 2010) or because job prospects for those unemployed were dismal in nearly all labor markets (Frey 2009 ). The 1980s onset of mobility decline among those expecting to move predates the recession by decades, however, suggesting that any effect of the recession on the expectation-mobility link merely exacerbated an established trend in American mobility. Moreover, supplemental analysis (not shown) reveals that evidence of the weakening link is robust in the prerecession era .
Taken together, these robust trends provide some evidence of rootedness among White householders but point also to a general increase in the likelihood of remaining stuck for White and Black householders alike. A full accounting of the causes of an increasingly stuck American population is beyond the scope of this article. The results reported here, however, are broadly consistent with the notion that social and economic shifts in the latter half of the twentieth century have left a large share of White and Black householders with fewer options for and a weakened ability to take advantage of opportunities elsewhere. I outline several opportunities for future research in the discussion that follows.
DIScuSSIOn AnD cOncluSIOn
Before discussing the implications of these findings and suggesting avenues for future research, it should be noted that this study is not without its limitations. Though I describe trends in the expectation of mobility over time, it remains unclear exactly why expectations have declined among White but not Black householders. This is due in part to the limitations of PSID items gauging the expectation of mobility. For example, the PSID does not distinguish between long-or shortdistance mobility aspirations. While both local mobility and long-distance migration have declined since the 1970s, it is unclear whether expectations of both long-and short-distance movement adhere to the racial and temporal patterns uncovered here. Thus, the degree to which this study can speak specifically to labor market migration or local mobility expectations is limited. With these limitations in mind, I speculate that demographic shifts like native White population aging drive White expectation decline, but future work should shed light on these dynamics. Future analyses, where possible, should also consider whether mobility desires (e.g., those measured longitudinally in the Survey of Income and Program Participation) change alongside mobility expectations as this could inform the characterization of immobile individuals as either rooted or stuck.
Additionally, because of sample size issues in the PSID prior to the early 1990s, this study includes only non-Latino White and non-Latino Black householders. But the increasing diversity of the American population necessitates an understanding of the link between expectations and actual mobility for Latinos, Asians, immigrant, and other ethnic and racial groups. Incorporating these householders into the analysis, where and when possible, may expand our understanding of racial and ethnic stratification in the expectation-mobility link while also broadening our understanding of how racial and ethnic segregation and inequality are perpetuated.
Despite these limitations, this study finds evidence of a persistent Black-White gap in the ability of householders to move when they expect to, with little sign of narrowing even as segregation declines and legal barriers to discrimination are erected. Relative to their White counterparts, Black householders remain less likely to move when they expect to and more likely to move unexpectedly. Results of multivariate logistic regression confirm the expectations of the strong version of the place stratification perspective: Black householders are less able than Whites to leverage socioeconomic status when translating expectations into moves.
Typically, this sort of evidence is assumed to reflect discrimination in the housing market.
Results showing that Black and White householders experience local housing markets differently offer support for this conclusion, but it is possible that mechanisms other than (or in addition to) discrimination may account for these results. For example, recent work has shown that racial and ethnic "blindspots" in knowledge of potential destinations, which are themselves shaped by legacies of discrimination and prejudice, may perpetuate disparities in neighborhood attainment (Krysan and Bader 2009 ). As such, the results presented here echo recent calls for deeper theoretical insights into the early stages of the residential mobility process (Crowder and Krysan 2016) , which could shed more light on racial gaps in moving as expected.
No matter what the precise mechanism, racial stratification in the realization of mobility expectations in the context of contemporary mobility declines perpetuates segregation, stratification in neighborhood quality, and the intergenerational transfer of contexts of disadvantage. Black mobility out of disadvantaged neighborhoods is uncommon, both generally and relative to Whites (Crowder and South 2005; South and Crowder 1997) , and when Black householders do move, it is all too often between contexts of disadvantage rather than out of them (Sharkey 2013) . Coupled with Black intergenerational declines in mobility and migration rates (Sharkey 2015) and the disadvantaged neighborhood contexts of Black householders, persistent Black-White gaps in the ability to move as expected reproduce inequality across generations (Massey and Denton 1993; Sharkey 2013) .
The analyses presented here fail to pin down why most Black and some White householders expecting to move in the near future are increasingly likely to remain stuck, but documenting this phenomenon adds nuance to evolving understandings of the drivers of long-term mobility decline in the United States. Previous attempts at explaining long-term mobility and migration decline, when ultimately unsuccessful, conclude that the causes must be "deep and pervasive" (Fischer 2002 ) and "affect a large fraction of the workforce and broad swaths of the economy" (Molloy et al. 2017) . By some accounts, rootedness driven by technological innovation is to blame (Cooke 2011 (Cooke , 2013 Fischer 2002 ). Other recent work (Molloy et al. 2017) points instead to social and economic shifts in the latter half of the twentieth century that fundamentally changed the costs and benefits associated with mobility; results reported here suggest that those shifts may have simultaneously weakened the ability of householders to translate expectations of mobility into moves. Future research should seek to understand precisely how and why potential movers' cost/benefit calculus has changed over time as well as why those who expect to move after making those calculations are increasingly unlikely to do so.
Much of the existing research on changing costs and benefits concentrates on long-distance migration decline between states and labor markets. In their recent analysis of declines in job transitions and interstate migration, for example, Molloy and colleagues (2017) consider how dual-earner households and the proliferation of occupational licensing codes increase migration costs as well as how increasing bifurcation in and convergence across American labor markets decreases the benefits of migration. However, none of these mechanisms provides a convincing explanation of migration and job transition declines. I echo their call for more research on how declining wage returns to migration or the increasing value of firm-specific human capital may increase migration costs, but I do so with some hesitation. While these agendas are important, they will ultimately fail to explain rising immobility in the United States because long-distance migration decline accounts for only a small fraction of all mobility decline over the past four or five decades (Fischer 2002) . As such, future research should more explicitly consider how the costs and benefits associated with local mobility have changed over time.
One potentially fruitful area of research suggested by the results reported here involves understanding how local housing market contexts and in particular rising housing costs influence the likelihood of forming and realizing mobility expectations. Since the creation of the federal poverty line in 1960, the cost of housing has risen faster than costs for other necessities (Eggers and Moumen 2008) , forcing families to devote ever increasing shares of household income to shelter. Using the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's (2012) 30 percent of household income guideline, 37 percent of all US households faced excessive housing costs as of 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau 2010); low-income, impoverished, single parent, minority, and renter households are typically overrepresented in that number (Chi and Laquatra 1998; Mimura 2008; Quigley and Raphael 2004) . The results presented here confirm that householders are less mobile in more expensive housing markets, regardless of whether they expect to move or not, likely because of the difficulties inherent in finding affordable housing. For homeowners, rising costs mean a larger investment and potentially a larger loss should markets sour as they did during the foreclosure crisis and Great Recession-particularly among Black homeowners and in predominantly Black neighborhoods (Rugh and Massey 2010) . For renters, rising costs mean larger deposits on relocation, which may force disadvantaged and hypermobile renters into inadequate, substandard units in less desirable neighborhoods (Desmond, Gershenson, and Kiviat 2015) . Increasing housing cost burdens and declining mobility since 1980 track one another rather conspicuously, but future research should explore whether changes in housing costs and other housing market characteristics might meaningfully contribute to concomitant changes in the formation and realization of mobility expectations.
Future research should also consider more carefully the interconnections between residential segregation by race and socioeconomic status, declining expectation of mobility among Whites, and weakening link between expectations and mobility. The increasing tendency of Black householders to remain stuck may be entangled in important ways with the increasing rootedness of a large share of the White population. A plausible interpretation of White rootedness in the long history of racial segregation is that White householders are resting on locational advantages obtained over decades of housing market discrimination, de jure and de facto segregation, and strategic public investment in White and disinvestment in Black communities. Support for the strong version of the stratification perspective reported here lends credence to this interpretation. Indeed, given this segmentation and the competition for limited space and resources, the increasing rootedness of the White population may require increasingly stuck minority populations. At the same time, however, research has shown that native White householders are less likely to move when local neighborhood alternatives are more diverse (Crowder, Hall, and Tolnay 2011) . As such, trends toward integration may contribute to the rootedness of native Whites by decreasing the availability of predominantly White neighborhood alternatives. Future research could test these hypotheses and shed light on the intergenerational transfer of neighborhood contexts by examining whether and how the tendency of households to remain rooted or stuck in more and less advantaged neighborhoods changes over time and is stratified by race and ethnicity.
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